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The Bounty Clause of the Mc Kinley Bill.
The History of the Bill and Substance of the Clause under Consideration.
The subject on which we have undertaken to write was introduced in Congress April 16, 1890, by Mr. Mc Kinley of Ohio
to equalize duties on imports and to reduce the revenues of
ithe government", Which is commonly called by his name:- The
ic Kinley Bill.
It had long been under consideration in the Committee on
Ways and Means. The measure was brought up for discussion on
May 7, and it was determined to limit general debate to.four
days and then allow eight days for consideration, section by
section, under the five minute rule. The bill was passed after considerable debate; and the clause of the bill which it
is necessary for us to consider reads as follows:- That on
land after July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, and
jntil July first, nineteen hundred and five, there shall be
aid, from any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropri1ated, under the provisions of section three thousand six hundred and eighty-nine of the Revised Statutes, to the producer
of sugar testing not less than ninety degrees by the polariscope, from beets, sorghum, or sugar-cane grown within the
United States, or from maple sap produced within the United
States, a bounty of two cents per pound; and upon such sugar
Itesting less than ninety degrees by the polariscope, and not
less thaneighty degrees, a bounty of one and three-fourths
cents per pound, under such rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall prescribe. And for the payment
of these bounties the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized
to draw warrants on the Treasurer of the United States for
such sums as shall be necessary, which sum shall be certified
Ito him by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, by whom the
bounties shall be disbursed, and no bounty shall be allowed or
paid to any person licensed as aforesaid in any one year upon
any quantity of sugar less than five hundred pounds.
It goes without saying, that there is no nation in the
world under any system, where the same reward is given to the
labor of men's hands and the work of their brain as in the
United States. We have widened the sphere of human endeavour
and given to every man a fair chance in the race of life and
in the attainment of the highest possibilities of human destiny. Does the citizen of such a nation require something more
Ito goad him on in any honest pursuit? Our national legislature
"seems to have thought as much when, to sooth the coquetted
sugar growers, they proposed to take millions that do not belong to them out of the pockets of the people to lure men to
engage in the production of sugar. How many drops of sweat
,have they poured out over these dollars that they propose to
take by the million from the Treasury and throw at the feet
of their favorites? Where did it come from? It was extorted
from the pockets of the poor laboring people of the country
by excessive rates of taxation. But the measure is on our
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statute books, and it remains for us to consider its constitutionality.
Subject Matter is Taxation.
Tt is patent that the subject matter of this bill is
taxation, and it must stand or fall under the powers or restrictions found in our federal constitution as interpreted
and understood by the courts and people of the United States.
The provisions of the constitution of the United States
in regard to taxation, and which ought, we think, to be our
guide through these few pages, is as follows:
The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imports and excises, to pay the debts and provide forl
the common defense and general welfare of the United States;
but all duties, imports and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. (Article I,' Section 8, U. S. Con.)
A tax is a forced contribution from a citizen to be applied to governmental purposes, the money must be applied to
the common good of the inhabitants of the locality over which
the power of taxation is exercised in the particular instance.
The power of taxation is given by all for the benefit of all;
and should be subjected to that government only, which belongs
to all, ( Mc Cullough vs. Maryland, 4 Wheaton- ) and the limitations contained in the United States constitution, impose
substantial equality and uniformity in taxation, and compel
equal burden of all subjects of immediate competition.
Distinction between State and National power of Taxation.
A state has, by virtue of its sovereignty, an inherent
right of taxation; and we concede that that power is absolute
except in so far as restricted by the state constitution, and!
the taking of the property can reasonably be said to come wit#in the defination of a tax.
But such cannot be said of the United States. Its powers
to tax must be found in the federal constitution, and the legitimate exercise of this power is no greater than the words
granting it fairly import; in short,- the state has all power
which follows sovereignty, except as restricted by its constitution
or that of the United States;, the United States has
only such power as is granted .by its constitution.
This distinction should be kept sharply in view in conisidering this or any other constitutional question; and parilticularly in reading and applying adjudicated cases under eac.L
Concluding that the national legislature has power to
legislate only on the subjects and for the purposes set forth,
iin the constitution of the United States, it is limited to thn
fcontents of Article first of section eight, above set forth,
!as to its taxing power.
What is meant by the words"general welfare" as used in
.this article of the constitution, is a question of great moment in considering the Bounty Clause of the Mc Kinley Bill.
We maintain that the words should be given the meaning which
the citizen in the ordinary walks and stations in life would
give to it, that is, its common and ordinary meaning.
The
reason we insist on this interpretation is, not only
that it
is one of the legal rules of interpritation, but because it is
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the language of the people from whom it owes its existance.
rhe convention which framed the constitution was, indeed, electqd by the state legislatures. But the instrument when it came
f rom their hands was a mere proposal, without obligation, or
retentions to it.
It was reported to the then existing conEress with a request that it might be submitted to a convenion of delegates, chosen in each state by the people thereof,!
nder the recommendation'of its legislature, for their assent
hnd ratification. By the convention, congress and the state
Legislatures, the instrument was submitted to the people. They
!acted upon it, and from their act the constitution derives
its whole authority. ( Mc Cullough vs. Maryland. Sedgwick Con.
aw 413.
Would you or I, or any other American, possessing the
kmerican ideas of' government, give or intend, by the use of
the words"general welfare", a meaning which would be so broad
s to include a power assumed by the Bounty Clause of the Mc
inley Bill? Clearly not, for that provision assumes to im.ose a tax for the purpose of keeping those already in the
usiness of producing sugar, at their old occupation. Can it
fbe said to be for the general welfare when comparatively few
iengage in the production?
If it is improfitable for the agriulturists of our country to produce sugar-, why not let them
,,engage in some pursuit in which they might find profit, as the
reater number of".1ave to do. In the course of debate on this
Slause of the bill in congress, Mr. O'Donnell made the folowing remark: "For a hundred years we have sought to encourge the cultivation of sugar, and now are confronted with the
diisappointing fact that the yield is declining". He goes on
citing other countries who have given bounties and with an increase of sugar. If we import so much sugar and other countries are producing so much more than us, who have protected
sugar by a tariff, why not let it in free and buy our sugar
broad? This would lower the price without paying money as
'a bounty, without taking money out of peoples pockets to entice a few to engage in an occupatiorin order to get at this
Drize, an occupation which has proved to be unsuccessful. If
the production has been protected and failed to increase, thisl
is the best proof that there are other products which are more
profitable to the farmers of the natioras a whole. ( Vol.21
ongressional Record.)
The constitution owes its whole force and authority to
tits ratification by the people; and they judged it by the
4-eaning apparent on its face according to the general use of
lithe words employed, when they do not appear to have been used
lin a legal or technical sense. ( Sedgwick Con. Law 413)
"To
i~rovide for general welfare", contains no technical or legal
ords; and the people in adopting them must have understood
land meant by using them, that they would be understood in the
only sense which they can convey, to wit::general welfare as
distinguished from private welfare. To hold that the objects
of the Bounty Clause of the Mc Kinley Bill were for the general or public welfare, would be straining and giving to the
*ords a meaning clearly foreign to that of the people
in adopting the constitution, and in violation of the familiar
rules of interpritation and construction.
Concluding that this power was not intended to be given
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Ito congress by the people, from the fact that they used the
words "general welfare" in their ordinary meaning, we will
now consider the legal meaning of those words and words conveying meaning analogous to them, as understood and expounded
by high authorities, both state and national.
§4
General Welfare unu Public Purpose.
I have determined to treat the above terms as meaning a-,
bout the same thing, for that which is for the general welfare is for a public purpose, and that which is for a public
purpose is for the general welfare of the locality or territory which is intended to be benefited by it.
Taxation, in the very meaning of the term, implies the
raising of money for public use, and excludes the raising of
it for private purposes,- thus the legislature cannot tax A
in order to give the money to B; so a tax on agencies of foreign insurance companies doing business in the state, made
payable to a private corporation for the relief of disabled
firemen, has been held invalid; ( 39 Pa. St.,73 ) also, a lawl
authorizing taxation to repay individuals, money paid by them
for procuring substitutes for themselves, has in some courts
been held unconstitutional for the same reason. It has been
generally held that statutes allowing municipalities to aidI
in the construction of railroads and similar improvements,
which by terminating in or running through the municipality
will benefit the municipality, are constitutional and valid. F
But these decisions have been questioned. Even conceding that
they are sound, a great distinction exists between the benefits to be derived from a railroad passing through a locality
and thq benefit, if any, expected to be derived from the suga'
bounties, to the public. The decisions in the several states
seem all to have been in favor of the legislature to build
railways, at the public expense. They seemed to consider them i
la species of internal improvement, or intercommunication,
which is, in a measure, indispensible to public interests,
i
and public functions; in many ways. The right of the United
States to do, or to aid in doing the same for purposes of conveying the mails, the army and its materials, seems now to be
almost universally conceded. The dissenting opinions of some
of the judges in the cases sustaining the validity of statutes authorizing municipalities to subscribe for railroad
stock, would appear to have the advantage of the argument,
especially where it has been attempted to impose a burden upion a municipal corporation for the erection of railroads be1yond its territorial limits, although incidentally affecting
their pecuniary interests, by way of business.
Mr. Burroughs in his work on taxation criticises the
soundness of these decisions and aays "that a railroad in the
hands of a private corporation, is no more operated for a public use than a manufactory, a newspaper establishment, or any'
other means for carrying on by individuals of a business which
while private in its nature, nevertheless supplies a public
need", but the weight of authority is all in one direction,
and it is now to late to bring the matter into serious debatel.
Bonds issued by a municipal corporation, in aid of a man-
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ufacturing enterprise owned by private persons, have been
1held void by the Citizen's Savings Bank vs. City of Topeka,
f3Dill, 376.
An act was passed in the state of Kansas "to authorize
cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, aiding railroads, water power, or other works of I
internal improvement". Section 76 reads as follows: The council shall have power to encourage the establishment of manufactories and such other enterp-ises as may tend to develope I
and improve such city; and etc. It was held by Mr. Justice
Miller in delivering the opinion of the court, " This power
( taxing power ) can as readily be employed against one class
of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one
class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other,
if there is no limitation of the uses for which the power may
be exercised. To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to be'
stow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprise.
and build up private fortunes, is none the less robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative form. Nor is it taxation. It is undoubtably the duty of
the legislature, which imposes or authorizes municipalities
to impose a tax, to see that it is not to be used for the
purpose of private interests instead of a public use, and the
courts can only be justified in interposing when a violation
of this principle is clear and reason for inferencef-cogent.
And in deciding a given case, whether the objects for which
the taxes are assessed, fall on the one side 6r the other of i
this line, they must be governed mainly by the course and us-,
age of the government, the objects for which taxes have been
customarily and by long course of legislation levied, what ob
jects or purposes have beelconsidered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the government, whether state
or municipal. Whatever lawfully pertains to this and is sanctioned by time and the aquiesence of the people may weil be
held to belong to the public use, and proper for the maintainence of good government, though this may not be the only criterion of rightful taxation. But in this case before us, in
which the towns are authorized to contribute aid by way oftaxation to any class of manufacturies, there is no difficultj
in holding that this is not such a public purpose as we have
been conside ring". ( 20 Wallace ).
Shortly after the Boston fire of 1872, which destroyed
a large part of the city, the governor called the legislature
together to relieve the sufferers. The legislature authorized!
the city to bind itself to the owners of the ground whose
buildings had been destroyed, to aid them in rebuilding; and
it was held not to be a public purpose. In the opinion of th:
court in this case it is said, "It is the essential character
of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine
its validity, as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of
the interests to be affected, nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the cormunity, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion". (111
Mass., 463 .)
It seems clear that the resulting advantage, if any, does
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not give to the means by which it is produced, the character
of a public purpose.
There are cases in which the power of
!the government is used to affect private rights of property
in favor of individuals or corporations, such as railroads
and turnpikes; in whose favor the right of eminent domain
is
frequently exercised. Private rights are taken and transferred
to the private corporation on payment of the compensation to
the injured persons; but this is proper as a public purpose,
if proper at all, on the grounds that the public receive a
direct benefit from the increased facilities for transportation of freight and passengers. The franchises of these corporations are charged with this
trust
for the performance of
the public service, for which they were granted.
It is true,
that the property, necessary for the establishment and management of these great thoroughfares, is vested in corporations or individuals; but it is in trust for the public. The
corporations or individuals have not the general powers over
the prpperty incident to the absolute right
in the property;
they are obliged to use it
in a particular
manner, and for
the accomplishment of a well defined object. ( 4 Metcalf,566)
It has been held that a municipality cannot be authorized to lay a tax in aid of a private educational institution
In Maine an act allowing a town to raise m6ney by taxation
to loan to individuals on condition of their establishing a
manufactory in the town, has been held void.
Perhaps the strongest case against our position is that
of the Town of Guilford vs. Suvervisors of Chenango County,
in which Ju(lge Denio holds that the legislature is the sole
judge of what is for the public good. ( 13 N. Y.,
143 ) It
'was said in 6 Abb. N. C., 246, "that to hold that one mans
property can, by special law, be taken or incumbered in a manner and by proceedings that do not apply to all, is tyranny,
and revolting to the theory and sentiments of republican equality. Wherein consists the assured safety and permanence
of the constitutional rights of property ot- liberty? Such an
enactment is more like revolution than the administration of
just and equal laws, and has no warrant in the law, or in the
customs of our fathers." Is not the above lanp'uage applicable
with much force to the Bounty Clause of the Mc Kinley Bill?
For here is a plain discrimination between our citizens and
different occupations.
The case of the Town of Guilford vs.
Supervisors of Chenango County seems to be overruled by 64
N. Y., 91; and, as our opinion and views of the power of taxation coincides with those expressed in the opinion of the
case, we beg leave to quote, to considerable length, the language therein used, to express such opinion and views.
In
this case the village of Douglas was authorized by the legislature to take stocks in the Long Eddy Hydraulic and Manufac-:
turing Company, and to issue bonds to raise the money to pay
for such stocks, and to levy and collect takes for the payment of the principal
and interest
6n such bonds. The company
was erpowerel by the le-is_1atiire to build a dam across the
Deleware river. The objects and purposes of said company were
not strictly or exclusively of a private nature, but, to some
extent, partook of a public character, and were sufficiently
broad and extended to include a public use, and the material
growth and prosperity of the village
would have been largely
increased by the accomplishment of the objects of the company
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as it would have added a large taxpaying element thereto, inIcreased the value of the adjacent property, and furnished an
lextensive manufactory for lumber and oth r raw materials, and,
1
the convenience of public business promoted by the cleaning
out of the channel of said river and the construction of docking and piers on the bank of the same, which would have come
within the apparent objects and purposes of the company. Judge
Folger, in delivering the opinion, said: "Now it is true, that
I
there are opinions given in adjudications upon this general
subject, which go to great length in declaring the extent of
the legislative power of taxation, and which, if taken in all,
the scope of the sentiments uttered, seem to permit an exten-i
sion of it without limit, and deny any judicial power to fix I
a bound to it, or to question in any case the legislative righ*
to exercise and delegate it. Perhaps the most noted of these
in this state, and which may be taken as an example of all,
is the case of the Town of Guilford vs. Supervisors of Chenango County. ( Cited above.) It is not needed that we now
deny that there is no limitation whatever upon the legislativ4
power to tax, considered as to the amount which shall be raisi
ed thereby, and the subjects from whichit shall be raised, unless a limit is found in express constitutional restrictions.
When however, we come to deal with the power of taxation in
reference to the purposes or which it is to be exercised, we
may not admit so much. It cannot but be conceded that there
is an end to it somewhere.Every mind must be able to concieve
of some legislative attempt to exercise this great and extensive power, which would fail to find warrant either in our
written constitution or in any inherent governmental authority, and which the owner of property subjected to it would
To use the not uncommon illustrahave the power to resist.
tion, it must be far beyond the reach of real legislative authority to take the property of A and give it to B, when ther
is no legal, equitable, just or moral obligation to render tol
B one farthing. But to tax A to raise money to pay over to B,
is only a way of taking his property for that purpose. If A
may of right resist this, as surely he may, how is he to make'
resistance effective and peaceable save through the courts,
which are set to be his guardian? How may the courts aid and
guard him, unless they have the power, upon his complaint, to
examine into the legislative act, and to determine whether the
extreme boundary of legislative power has been reached and
passed? So that the legislature is not sole, supreme and unIrestrainable therein, and the courts are not debarred, but
,may, as a co-ordinate branch of the government, scrutinize and
measure the legislative act; always keeping in mind that the
legislature is the primary authority which is to inquire what
is a proper purpose for the application of money to be raised
'by taxation. It may be conceded that that is a public purlpose, from the attainment of which will flow some benefit or
convenience to the public, whether of the whole commonwealth
or of a circumscribed community. But the convenience must be
Idirect and immediate from the purpose and not collateralre
,mote or consequential.The citizen should not be made to depend for it upon the spontaneous actions of others, or to receive it in uncertain degree or manner or roundabout way, or
'hampered with discriminati4ng distinctions and conditions.
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The benefit to the public is remote and consequential". ( See
also 14 N. Y., 515.)
If this decision was of the United
States courts, it would, I urge, be final and conclusive of
the question under consideration. If the state of facts which
existed in 64 N. Y., 91, was not sufficient to sustain a public purpose, surely, the measure we are discussing would falli
far short of it.
And, we must also remember, as we have sug-,
gested in the opening lines of this theses, that the reasonin
of this case coming up under a state constitution, which is
merely restrictive, must have more force under athe national
constitution, which enumerates the powers and gives only such!
as it enumerates and are incident thereto.
There are strong expressions to be found in many cases
which would seem to favor the idea that the taxing power is
without limit, as far as the control of the courts is concerned; the principal one we have met is Mc Cullough vs. Maryland,
4 Wheaton, in which Judge Marshall says: " The only security
against the abuse of this power is found in the structure oi
the government itself. In imposing a tax, the government acts
upon its constituents; this is, in general, sufficient security against erronious and oppressive taxation. The people of
the state, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their property; and as the exigencies of K'
the government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limit to
the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the inter-I
est of the legislature and the influence of the constituents
over their representatives to guard them against its abuse."
It was decided in *his case that a bank was a proper and ne.
cessary' instrumentality to be used in conducting the finan-i
cial affairs of the federal government, and that the sovereignty of the state did not extend to instrumentalities of
the federal government, as, by the compact between the states,
that government was to be supreme within the limits of the
power vested in it.
It is undoubtably true that the exigen- i
cies of the government cannot be lilfited, and as a general
rule, the people prescribe no limits to the exercise of this
right; we suppose by exigencies is meant the necessity of the i
government for revenue for the purposes of government; to thin
there is no limit, and the abuse of this must be corrected by
the influence of the constituents on the legislature. But we
cannot suppose that this able jurist meant to say that the
legislature could impose a tax for a private purpose, and
Ithat the'e was no remedy in such a case but the one named. It'
seems to us that the true meaning to be attached to the lanI guage is, that when taxes are imposed for a proper governmental purpose, the amount, the subjects and mode of imposition
are vested in the legislature alone. ( Burroughs on Taxation.)
Whether the purpose is a public one is a question for the
courts. If the legislature can determine whether the use is
a public one, then the safe guards in the bill of ri-hts and
constitutions of the states and United States for the protection of private property are valueless.
The legislature cannot, by declaring the use to be public, when it is within the
constitution a private use, authorize the property of one citizen to be taken from him and given to another. If taxation
is not for public purposes, it is plunder.
Taxation takes money for a public use; and the tax payer
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receives, or is supposed to receive his just compensation in
the prtection which government affords to his life, liberty
and property, and in the increase of the value of his possession ,by the use to which the government applies the money
raised by the tax. ( 4 N. Y., 422. 47 N. Y., 613. )
Judge Appleton, in 59 Me., 315, said of an act authorizing a town to refund money voluntarily contributed by an in.
dividual in 1864, to aid the town in procuring soldiers to
fill its quota, that it was not for a puin
urpose, that it
was a mere gift as a recompense for past generosity. In 1871
the legislature of Maine requested the opinions of the justices of the supreme court of that state on the following
question: Has the legislature authority under the constitutioi
to pass laws enabling towns, by gift of money or loan of bond3
to assist individualsior corporations to establish or carry
on manufacturing of various kinds, within or without the limits of said towns? We quote the following from the answer as
given by the judges Appleton, Walton and Danforth: " Individ-I
uals and corporations embark in manufactories for the purpose
of personal and corporate gain. Their purposes and objects
are precisely the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic,
or the day laborer. They engage in the selected branch of manufacturing for the purpose and with the hope and expectation,;
not of loss, but of profit. Now the individual or corporate
manufactory will in the outset promise to be, and in the result will be, either a judicious and gainful undertaking, or
an unjudicious and losing one. If it be gainful, there seems
to be no public purpose to be accomplished by assessing a tax
on reluctant citizens and coercing its collection to swell
the gains of successful enterprise. If the business be a
losing one, it is not readily perceived what public or governmental purpose is attained by those who would have received n
share of the profits, to pay for the loss of an unprosperous
manufacturer, whether arising from folly, incapacity, or othe
cause. The tax payer should not be compelled to pay for the
loss when he is denied a share of the profits. If the right
of confisicating the private property of individuals for the
purpose of giving it away to one branch of industry can be
conferred upon towns, one does not easily see when or what
bound can be imposed or limitation made. The general benefit
to the community resulting from every description of well directed labor is of the same character, whatever may be the
branch of industry upon which it may be expounded. All useful
laborers, no matter whit the field of labor, serve the state
by increaseing the aggregate of its products, its wealth.
There is nothing of a public nature any more entitling the
manufacturer to public gifts than the sailor, the mechanic,
the lumberman, or the farmer. Our government is based on the
equality of rights. All honest employments are honorable. We]
cannot rightfully discriminate among occupations, for a discrimination in favor of one branch of industry is a discrimination adverse to all other branches. The state is equally
to protect all, giving no undue advantage or special and exclusive preference to any."
In 49 Ill., 316, a town was authorized to levy a bounty
tax, and the town meeting voted to levy the tax, and the mone y
advanced by individuals upon the f:ith of such vote,
was
II
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recognized by the town as a binding debt. The court held thatl
while the legislature cannot authorize a town to lay a tax
for the purpose of raising money to be bestowed as a private
gratuity, or used for any purpose that cannot reasonably be
considered corporate, on the other hand, we must recognize
its power to authorize taxation in order to refund money advanced by individuals for the public welfare, in a pressing
emergency, upon an understanding for repayment.
We heartily
concur in the above holding; for would the opening of a road,1
the laying out of a public square, the purchase of a fire engine, the erection of an alms-house, be as important to the
general interests of a community, as was exemption from the
necessary but dreaded conscription during the last years of
the late war?
Doubtless, in all communities, there wer-e tax
payers who
would not be personally liable to the draft, but
who was ther . , in any connmunity, so isolated as not to be liaf
ble to be stricken by it through his kindred or friends, or
injured in his pecuniary interests through the complex relations which men bear to one another in society?
Can it be
truthfully said that the sudden tearing away of whole classes
of such men was not an injury to the entire community, and
that a tax, by which it could be avoided was essentially different from that provided by the Bounty Clause of the Mc Kinley Bill?
Under the system of drafting adopted by the federal government, each city and township was assessed for its
respective quota of men.
It was determined what amount of
military service was due to the government from each municipal community, under the acts of congress to which all owe
obedience. The rendition of the service was a burden resting
on the entire community, and no more due from one individual
member of it than from another. The service being thus due
from the entire population of the town, and, as citizens of a
common country, due from all the constituents of the population alike. The service was rendered against a town as a corporate community, and as such community it renders the servic
by the aid of a corporate tax. The tax was levied, not for
the benefit of the volunteers, but for that of the community
to which it brought relief.
By an act of the legislature of Wisconsin, the town of
Jefferson was authorized to raise by tax a sum of money to
aid in the erection of buildings for the "Jefferson Liberal
Institutes", in said town, in case a majority of the votes
cast upon that question at the town meeting, should be in favor of said tax. The electors having decided affirmatively,
the town was accordingly assessed. Defendant as town treasurer
proceeded to collect the same against the plaintiff.
In de" The benefit for
livering the opinion, Judge Dixon said:
which the taxes were attempted to be assessed and collected,
the town is not a stockholdr and
is essentially private;
has no voice in the matter, the tax payers have no privileges!
the citizens
may exclude all
the trustees
not common to all,
of the town from the institution. We feel no doubt in saying
us at first
that the act is unconstitutional. It strikes
blush that this is not the levy and collection of money for
public purposes. It is but a most frivolous pretext for giving to a corporation money exacted from the tax payers, which
a just and honorable man would hesitate to receive.
Nor will'
the location at Jefferson of the institution, and the inci-
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dental benefits which may thereby arise to the people of the
Itown, sustain the tax. This is not the kind of public interest and benefit which will authorize a resort to the power ofl
taxation.
Such benefits accrue to the people of all comrnunities fy.om the exercise in their midst of any useful trade an d
employment, and the argument pursued to its logical result
would prove that taxation might be made use of for the purpose of building up and sustaining every such trade or employ.
ment, though carried on by private persons for private ends,
or the purpos, of mere individual gain and emolument. Such a
power would be obviously incompatible with the genius and in-i
stitution of a free peop.le; and the practice of all liberalgovernments is against it. If we turn to the cases where tax-'
ation has been sustained as in pursuance of the power, we
shall find in every one of them that there was some direct advantage accruing to the public from the outlay."
(Curtis vs.
WhipTple, 24 Wisconsin.)
§5 )
Conclusion.
Bill Unconstitutional as to the Bounty Clause.
We submit

to the reader the logic and justice of the
Ireasoning in the cases cited as upholding the position we have
itaken; and, following such reasoning and sense of justice, we
hold that the conclusion is irresistable, the the Bounty
Clause of the McKinley Bill is not a tax for a public purpose, or for the general welfare of the people; hence, is not
within the power of the national legislature. The clause also
nMkes a distinction between the large and small producer of
sugar, which shows that equality or the increase of the product, was not in the minds of the legislators. The power not
existing in congress, the clause is absolutely void and of nol
effect.
Any publicibenefit which the bill might produce would not
be direct, but too remote and consequential and not within the
law. The maxim "Causa proxima non remota spectatur", or a
-principle analogous to such maxim, would apply, and such benefits, the law does not recognize as being a public purpose
because the same benefits are derived from every honorable
and useful occupation.

